Category: Blog
Evolving the World Bank’s Twin Goals
The World Bank management’s Evolution Roadmap suggests the institution is reconsidering its ‘twin goals’ mission statement of eradicating extreme poverty (ending $2.15 poverty by 2030) and boosting shared prosperity (raising the incomes of the bottom 40 percent in each country).
“nearly half the world – over 3 billion people – lives on less than US$6.85 per day, the average of the national poverty lines of upper-middle income countries… The WBG [World Bank Group] could consider adding a higher poverty line to be targeted alongside extreme [$2.15] poverty. This might align with the WBG’s principle to “serve all clients”, including urgently supporting poor people in MICs…. The current metric of shared prosperity measures the extent to which economic growth is inclusive, by focusing on household consumption or income growth among the bottom 40 percent of the population, but not whether growth is sufficient to raise overall prosperity. The evolution exercise will review the current approach and explore the possibility of using new indicators for measuring prosperity. Approaches to be explored include adding a focus on raising national median income and paying enhanced attention to the gaps in prosperity between countries, among other options.”
It is reassuring that Bank management wants to keep the twin goals focused on consumption and prosperity. It is an important counterblast against those who see progress on the number of people living under the $2.15/day poverty line and suggest that the fight against poverty is close to being won, and other priorities can take center stage—as if $2.16 is an adequate daily consumption for a high quality of life. But the proposed fixes to the twin goals, alongside the Bank’s existing approach to higher poverty lines, are a mistake.
One poverty line to keep….
Sadly, according to a World Bank staff forecast, there will still be plenty of people living under $2.15 poverty in 2030—and there may still be people living under $2.15 a day in 2210. As long as the World Bank finally fixes the line rather than changing the calculation method every few years, the extreme poverty line should remain as an important indicator of global progress against poverty.
Meanwhile, the roadmap’s suggestion that focusing on consumption growth among the bottom 40 percent may not be a good indicator of “whether growth is sufficient to raise overall prosperity” is an interesting if perhaps ungrounded repudiation of the evidence presented in one of the World Bank research department’s most cited papers: “Growth is Good for the Poor.” That the average incomes of the poorest quintile rise proportionately with average incomes overall also implies prosperity overall rise with the incomes of the poorest quintile (and the one above). Of course, the second twin goal is also an inequality target, about reducing income gaps within countries, but is hardly (or even primarily) only that. If there is a problem with the current goals it is that they say too little about inequality, not too much.
…three lines to drop
Meanwhile, the Bank’s research department has proposed a number of higher poverty lines. Alongside the $2.15 “extreme” poverty line that is the median national poverty line of all of the countries defined by the Bank as “low income,” we have the median of lower middle income country poverty lines ($3.65), upper middle income poverty lines (the $6.85 figure referred to by the Roadmap), and high-income country poverty lines ($24.35), all expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) using the latest round of PPP data.
This approach is odd for two reasons. First, it puts steps in a relationship that clearly wants to be a slope (see the figure below taken from the Bank’s website). Second, the steps it creates are based on the Bank’s income classification for countries. Unlike the poverty lines and poverty data, which use purchasing power parity, these steps use market GDP per capita (using the Atlas method) to create groupings (which is why those groupings overlap when put on an x-axis in PPP GDP per capita). And those groupings are made on the basis of market GNI per capita cutoffs set in 1989, in turn related to earlier Bank operational policies. This all seems a strange way to decide which countries see more or less relative poverty.
So, when it comes to an absolute poverty line, $2.15 sadly has life in it yet. And any new higher absolute global line will be an arbitrary cutoff, and a very odd cutoff using the Bank’s current approach. Again, while everyone worldwide should be living on much more than $6.85 a day, or even $24.35 a day, a much higher line set as a target for World Bank attention would also shift focus away from the countries where most of the poorest people still live. And any such line will simply mask a more significant general truth: a declining marginal return to consumption in terms of everything from health through happiness to housing standards means that (all else equal) the World Bank is likely to have the greatest impact on global quality of life the more it invests in the world’s poorest people. Better to focus on those below $10 a day than above, better to focus on those below $5 a day than above, better to focus on those living on below $2.15 a day than those above. That’s true within and across countries and should be the primary guide as to where the World Bank directs subsidized finance in particular.
A new first goal: Maximizing consumption growth
When it comes to global poverty reduction, the Bank should deploy its subsidized resources with the goal of maximum individual consumption growth in developing countries. That means, in terms of goal accomplishment, it would value a dollar of investment equally if it raises consumption from $1 to $2 a day or $10 to $20. Or, put it another way: $1 million in World Bank grant resources used for an investment that has an annuity value of $10,000 a year in a population living on $1/day would be valued from the point of progress toward the goal the same as $1 million in World Bank grant resources that has an annuity value of $100,000 a year in a population living on $10/day.
That suggests the first goal for the institution could be to minimize the number below the poverty line, and maximize growth away from that line. To measure global progress on that, it would continue to report on $2.15 poverty (although fixing the line in real terms), and, for those over $2.15 consumption, add a measure of the average log distance between consumption and $2.15 for the population of World Bank client countries. (Of course, the World Bank Group’s own contribution to that global progress will be small: its annual operations are worth about 0.2 percent of the GDP of client countries).
A second goal: focusing on relative poverty within countries
With regard to relative poverty, if the goal of the Bank’s higher poverty lines is to calculate how many people are in relative poverty worldwide and to focus (primarily market-rate resources) on those in relative poverty, it would be far better to use a common metric, one that abandons reliance on artificial breaks in the poverty line-income relationship and mixing market and purchasing power parity incomes. In addition, it would surely be good to hew to the Bank’s approach of using national poverty lines as a basis, and perhaps even better to stick to one source of income data (national surveys).
A simple approach would be to take the average global national poverty line as a percentage of mean consumption. Using data from the World Bank’s poverty calculations and website it appears that, around the world, the poverty line is set at an average of about 54 percent of mean consumption. The Bank’s goal (and relative poverty line) could be to maximize the consumption of people living on less than fifty percent of average consumption in their country, then. This is broadly the approach to relative poverty proposed by Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion in 2000 based on earlier work by Atkinson and Bourguignon. It is also only a little different from the current focus on the bottom forty percent of the income distribution, but better aligned with national definitions of poverty.
That said, the relationship between poverty lines and mean consumption looks a little more complex than a flat line (see the figure below—and once again this was noted by Chen and Ravallion a long time back). Poorer countries set poverty lines closer to mean incomes. If the Bank wanted to take that into account, it could use the cross-county relationship between the two to set the poverty line at a given mean consumption. Other approaches would be to adopt a moving average (use the poverty line/mean income of the closest twenty countries in terms of mean income) or a different functional form. But creating arbitrary steps in the data using arbitrary market income classifications based on World Bank operational policies seems just utterly too random. Surely the Bank can do better.
Do we need a third goal?
This leaves the question of the potential need for a new goal in an institution dedicated to do more on climate and other global public goods. The current approach simply suggests that the progress we want to see regarding relative and absolutely poverty should be sustainable, and perhaps that is adequate. But it is important to ensure that the activities the World Bank finances are effective, and so it might be worth spelling out that the institution supports the provision of global public goods when they are cost effective tool to meet the twin goals. For some shareholders, that is probably not enough: they want the institution to add a whole new mandate and focus on global public goods beyond their specific link to global prosperity and poverty reduction. But I think that is opening the door to making poor people pay twice for climate change and pandemics.
Regardless, both when it comes to ‘absolute’ poverty and relative poverty, the World Bank is over-fond of drawing lines through global income and consumption data, and the roadmap is a good time to evolve beyond that. The World Bank Group’s goals should be: (i) ending extreme poverty defined as living below the $2.15 a day poverty line, and maximizing consumption growth away from that line; (ii) sustainably increasing the living standards of people in every country living on less than fifty percent of average consumption in that country; and (iii) supporting the provision of global public goods when they are cost effective tools to meet the first two goals. Finally, it might worth making explicit that the first goal is primarily designed to focus the use of subsidized resources (IDA, trust funds), and the second to focus the use of market-rate resources (IFC, IBRD).
Figure: Poverty Line/Mean Income Against Mean Income
Sources: https://pip.worldbank.org/poverty-calculator for mean consumption/income, https://ourworldindata.org/from-1-90-to-2-15-a-day-the-updated-international-poverty-line for poverty lines and GDP per capita. Note some of this data refers to income rather than consumption. The clustering of values at the top end of incomes is likely because the data comes from the OECD and, rather than national poverty lines, is share of population living on less than 60% of median income after transfers (see Table B1 here)
Climate Finance: How to move from the Trillions to the People?
Climate finance has emerged as a major concern not just for African countries, but for the developing world at large. Global warming is estimated to generate a median loss of 1.5 percent of annual GDP in developing countries and in sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2022). At the same time, there is a rising occurrence of catastrophic events – droughts, floods, pandemics – that lead to the loss of years of development at once. It is poor people, women, and children that are the least able to protect themselves and bear the brunt of these shocks.
A recent meeting of African think tanks, under the Amplifying Africa’s Voices Initiative co-convened by ACET and the Finance for Development Lab (FDL) discussed existing knowledge on the pressing topic of climate finance and highlighted the need for further work to advance the cause of an effective and fair green transition on the African continent.
The key tensions between development and climate needs were not resolved at COP27. We are still very far from a credible agenda for a fair transition to a de-carbonated world. From a fairness perspective, Africa needs to be compensated for the emission gap (AfDB 2022). The continent generates 3% of global emissions, and yet it suffers most from climate change. North Americans emit 14 tons of CO2 per person annually; Chinese and Europeans 7 tons, and Africans emit just 1.1 tons. The African Development Bank estimates that climate debt requires a transfer from the rich world to Africa of more than $150b/year until 2050. But as the world aims for net zero carbon emissions by 2050, Africa’s aspiration is not just to be compensated for damages but also to use green development pathways. African countries should be able to take advantage of their comparative advantages, including renewable energy, green hydrogen production, and credible carbon offsets.
Think tanks need to be much closer to the ground to start bringing this vision closer to reality.
Where is climate finance for Africa?
Climate funds mobilized for African countries still fall far short of the amount needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and support adaptation and resilience. Worse, some of the funds that have been raised crowd out traditional development aid, and much of what is spent is tilted toward mitigation. A recent ACET report showed that for the period 2020-2030, the average annual climate funding needs for Africa are estimated at over $140bn per year – around $30bn for adaptation, $70bn for mitigation, and $40bn for loss and damage. This compares to current flows of only $20bn per year.
It is not going to be easy to raise these large amounts in a world of tight budget constraints. Several initiatives are needed, including reforming multilateral development banks (MDBs) and rechanneling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Moreover, different aspects of the problems require different types of financing:
- Adaptation finance should be largely financed by MDBs, since it covers projects with the characteristics of public goods. Allocation criteria should be related to climatic vulnerability, not just to poverty.
- Funding for climate mitigation should come largely from the private sector, and be supported with instruments to mitigate country risk through FDI, PPPs, guarantees, and other enhancements from MDBs.
- Loss and damage funds should be grants-based and may require a new global tax instrument to be put in place – for example in the domain of transport, carbon, or capital flows.
Most importantly, to move from trillions to people, we need to go beyond “back of the envelope” estimates and get closer to the ground to meet people’s needs. There are indications that rates of return on adaptation projects can be in the triple digits (see e.g. IMF 2022). But pipelines of actual projects ready to be financed remain hard to come by, especially for adaptation, but also for mitigation. To flow, climate finance needs to be irrigated by a pipeline of proposals. Getting there requires fieldwork to determine how to reduce vulnerability. It also requires large amounts of funding for technical assistance to build up financeable proposals for desirable projects. AUDA-NEPAD has provided this kind of capacity building and project preparation.
Listening to people’s voices
How can think tanks and civil society be more involved? There are already models in the continent that can be emulated. Through a series of webinars called “What is the voice of Africa?”, the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) has explored solutions proposed by African countries’ speakers to address their concerns about climate change.
Africa’s youth need to play a fundamental role, as they will be the primary bearers of the impacts of climate change. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has been working on capacity-building programs with young scholars on climate. The Kenyan Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) organized a Youth in Climate Change Action Symposium which informed policy briefs in preparation for COP27. But in Sharm-El-Sheikh, a big gap remained between closed-door negotiations and debates among civil society actors.
More pressure is needed to open up formal negotiations to demands emanating from citizens. At the national and global levels, we need mechanisms to hold leaders accountable, and for their pledges to be translated into concrete actions.
Defining climate change vulnerability
The newly approved Loss and Damage Fund was one of the successes of the COP27, as this has been an African priority in global climate negotiations for more than a decade (SAIIA, 2022). But central questions on the mechanism, its funding, and conditions of access remain wide open.
Conversations took place during COP27 on the urgency of defining economic and non-economic impacts of climate change, including factoring in social characteristics such as gender or age. A much better understanding is clearly needed about the connection between efforts to improve adaptation to global warming and loss and damage. Such adaptation measures include projects to build defenses against sea-level rising, reducing the salinity intrusion and floods, making resilient road and bridge infrastructure, and increasing water conservation. As an important additional benefit, adaptation will improve food security in a world with greater variability in food prices.
At the regional and local levels, work is needed to understand how efforts on adaptation can be better integrated to reduce the costs of natural disasters. In East Africa and the Sahel, the nexus between humanitarian or food insecurity needs is linked to efforts in adapting to climate change. Estimating needs and returns on certain investments could be a step forward in making the case for much more financing from the international community.
What is green growth?
In the future, African economic growth will have to be green. What constitutes green growth – growth that is sustainable and inclusive – remains to be imagined. Some elements are becoming clearer, but they need to be brought together into a coherent whole. Solar and hydroelectric energy can become a source of comparative advantage. With adapted technology transfers, economies could leapfrog to higher levels of productivity in many fields.
Progress in these areas requires large investment, technological transfers, and proper planning. In some cases, global reforms are needed. African initiatives to transform and strengthen carbon offsets markets could unlock large sources of financing: at $50/ton, $15b of annual revenue and 50 million jobs can be generated (Climate Action 2022). Those flows would compensate for global environmental services.
A tight connection between growth and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) needs to be achieved, which would help define needs, chart green development pathways, and link projects to funding sources. For instance, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) has recently introduced a task force with the Kenyan government and World Bank representatives, as well as other think tanks, which will look at the incentives and outcomes of green initiatives in Kenya. A national framework has been drafted and is awaiting approval for implementation. A further research and evaluation project will look at the integration of the green economy in Kenya and determine the outcomes to be evaluated.
Amidst a growing number of initiatives, this meeting clarified important questions that remain to achieve green development pathways: charting green growth with economic transformation and infrastructure investment, connecting them to financing sources, protecting vulnerable people and economic systems through adaptation, compensating losses, and rewarding global public goods contributions. Ultimately, it also implies reforming institutions to provide more voice and accountability from decision-makers.
This article was written in collaboration with participating think tanks from the Amplifying African Voices Initiative and jointly published
The World Bank Group’s Evolution Roadmap: More Work Needed
At the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF in October last year, shareholders asked the World Bank to come up with a set of proposals to take a larger role in climate and other global public goods. The Bank’s first response came pretty quick: by mid-December, only a couple of months after the request, the institution sent an evolution roadmap to the World Bank board. It is very much worth a read, with much to like but much to panic over, too. Unsurprisingly, given the timeline, a lot more thinking is needed.
On mission: The Bank suggests it is a good time to revisit the twin goals of eradicating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. The roadmap notes that it “is expected that, by the end of the 2020s, the majority of the world’s extreme poor will… reside in LICs [low-income countries] even though they make up less than 10 percent of the global population”—suggesting an extreme poverty target is irrelevant for most client countries. With regard to shared prosperity, the document floats “adding a focus on raising national median income and paying enhanced attention to the gaps in prosperity between countries.”
I hope to say more later on a better approach, but broadly it is to suggest the Bank adopts the goals of eliminating poverty under $2.15 a day and maximizing growth away from that line. That would retain a prioritized focus on the world’s poorest while acknowledging $2.16 is still an utterly inadequate level of consumption, and growth above that level is an important global priority. This could be matched with a relative poverty target within countries. But the stranger part of the mission section of the roadmap document regards the question “how can the World Bank Group ensure appropriate focus on global challenges in its Mission statement?” The question is asked, but goes utterly unanswered—even in terms of potential options. This seems a little concerning given that the main point of the evolution process is to embed global challenges in the institution’s operational and financial model.
On volumes and subsidies: I think the roadmap is absolutely right to clarify “[t]he WBG will need substantial additional financial capacity to respond to a more ambitious, updated Mission.” The Bank Group needs (a) capital increase(s) (general or climate-specific) alongside better leverage of existing capital. I think the roadmap is doubly right on the need to protect IDA resources for IDA countries. But I don’t see how to ensure contributions to World Bank climate subsidies in middle income countries don’t come at the expense of future IDA rounds, making people in poor countries pay twice for climate change. It is also disappointing to see the implicit assumption that the one tool at hand to promote demand for lending toward global public goods is subsidies. What about movement toward less bureaucratic financing models?
And when it comes to using subsidized cash, the lack of detail is even more concerning. The document proposes attracting lots of money to provide subsidies to projects with global public good elements, but makes no case made that those resources would be used efficiently. Past climate funds inside and outside the Bank appear to be terrible at maximizing greenhouse gas reductions per dollar spent, for example, financing projects with two or three orders of magnitude differences in terms of cost per tonne of CO2 mitigated. And it is concerning that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) thinks it can build “on the lessons learned about the catalytic effect of IDA’s Private Sector Window (PSW) in LICs” to develop a multi-donor trust fund for climate, given the lesson learned about the PSW’s catalytic effect is that there really isn’t much of one at all. The nightmare scenario of financing being diverted from effective development projects in the world’s poorest countries to subsidize ineffective ‘climate’ projects in richer middle-income countries is pretty much what you would expect on this record. Before proposing the trust funds and the retained profits to back those subsidies, the Bank needs a far stronger case that resources would be effectively used and would not come at the cost of world’s poorest people who are still, at least for the moment, front and center in the first of the institution’s twin goals.
Then there is the subject of cooperation: The roadmap might leave you thinking the World Bank is the only potential source of financing for global public goods. It isn’t. There are existing global institutions already providing climate and pandemic-related financing including the Global Climate Fund, Gavi, and all of the other multilateral development banks. Perhaps they have a comparative advantage in some elements of the agenda. Discussing relative roles and responsibilities should be an urgent priority, even if it is one that clearly needs to involve shareholders, too.
Finally, on process: The considerable gaps in thinking in the document is an important reason it should have been publicly released. There are a lot of people outside the offices of 1818 H Street who have knowledge, experience, and ideas relevant to the discussion. As much to the point, the World Bank should be seeking the legitimacy that comes with an open debate on evolution, in particular in its client countries. It was impressive to create a first evolution document in two months, it was a travesty to then sit on it for a month or longer given the whole evolution discussion is meant to take only a year. Future documents regarding the evolution should released within days of Board distribution, not a few months. The Bank Group should live up to what it says in the document about ”building consensus in a transparent, inclusive, and consultative manner.”
I think the Bank can and should do more on global public goods. I agree with the roadmap that means more resources for operations in middle income countries. But those resources should be spent effectively, and they cannot come at the cost of the world’s poorest people. The roadmap is a long way from guaranteeing either outcome or even laying out the route to global consensus on how to achieve those outcomes.
Transparency and World Bank Evolution
Late last year, the World Bank Group issued a roadmap on its potential evolution in response to shareholder pressure at this year’s Bank-Fund annual meetings. The roadmap document has been widely shared with member governments. As reported by Reuters and Devex on the basis of leaked copies, it proposes reforms to the World Bank Group’s mission and operations along with increased funding and a significant move into subsidizing the provision of global public goods in middle income economies–a major overhaul. The Bank should publish the roadmap immediately.
For good reason, the World Bank has a disclosure policy that defaults to open. It is an international institution that champions transparency as a tool of good governance, and that should apply to itself at least as much as to borrower countries. The disclosure policy has an exception for deliberative documents and ‘miscellaneous memoranda’ relating to the World Bank Board. That’s maybe reasonable. But the roadmap is about redesigning the institution as a whole, involving decision-making that reaches far beyond board deliberations. As a result, I’m not even sure according to the World Bank’s own rules it should have been kept confidential.
Regardless, the semi-confidentiality of access for a connected minority is the best that can be expected for a document with such wide distribution, and is utterly inappropriate for a multilateral body. The roadmap is about the approach to be taken by a major global institution dealing with global problems using global taxpayers’ money: it is hard to think of a topic that more deserves open, global accountability. And the timing for that accountability is short: the hope is for final agreement by this year’s World Bank Annual Meeting.
Given the important contents and wide distribution, it isn’t surprising the document leaked so widely. One copy ended up with Felix Salmon at Axios, who put it online. But the Bank should still publish a copy itself right now, rather than sometime after Board discussions, and do the same for future papers related to the Bank Group’s evolution. As the roadmap itself suggests, building “consensus in a transparent, inclusive, and consultative manner” will be vital to the process of the Bank’s evolution. The World Bank Group’s board and management should act like it.

